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1 Introduction
The collective approach, which Chiappori (1988, 1992) originally presented in the con-
text of household labor supply, has become increasingly popular for modeling house-
hold consumption behavior. This approach explicitly recognizes that multi-person
households consist of several individuals who have their own rational preferences.
These individuals jointly take consumption decisions, which are assumed to result in
Pareto e¢ cient intra-household allocations. This collective model provides a positive
answer to the methodological and empirical shortcomings of the traditional unitary
model, which assumes that multi-person households act as if they were single decision
makers.
Browning and Chiappori (1998) provided a characterization of a general collec-
tive consumption model, which allows for public consumption and externalities inside
the household; they take the minimalistic prior that the empirical analyst does not
know which commodities are characterized by public consumption and/or externali-
ties. Focusing on a parametric characterization of this general model, they establish
that for two-person households collectively rational consumption behavior requires
a pseudo-Slutsky matrix that can be written as the sum of a symmetric negative
semi-denite matrix and a rank one matrix. Browning and Chiappori show necessity
of this condition; Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) address the associated su¢ ciency
question.
The collective rationality test of Browning and Chiappori is parametric in na-
ture; it requires a (non-veriable) functional/parametric structure that is imposed
on the intra-household allocation process and the individual preferences. Cherchye,
De Rock and Vermeulen (2007a) established a nonparametric characterization of the
same general collective consumption model. More specically, by using revealed pref-
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erence axioms, they derived conditions that allow for testing whether observed house-
hold consumption behavior is collectively rational, without imposing any parametric
structure on the intra-household allocation process and individual preferences (pos-
sibly characterized by public consumption and positive externalities). As such, they
also complemented the literature that focuses on nonparametric characterizations and
tests of the unitary model; see, for example, Afriat (1967), Varian (1982) and, more
recently, Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2005).
Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2005) provided a rst application to real-
life data of these testable nonparametric collective rationality conditions. They test
the general collective consumption model on data drawn from the Russia Longitudi-
nal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The RLMS is one of the few surveys that enables
constructing a detailed panel of household consumption. Moreover, there is enough
intertemporal relative price variation to test behavioral models in a meaningful way,
even though the data contains only 8 observations per household (in casu couples
with nobody else in the household).
While Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2005) explicitly focused on testing al-
ternative behavioral models (including the unitary model), the current study mainly
concentrates on operational aspects associated with the nonparametric necessity test
for collective rationality. This focus on the necessary condition falls in line with
the very nature of the nonparametric approach that we follow, which typically con-
centrates on the minimal (or necessity) empirical restrictions that can be obtained
from the available data. Generally, such a nonparametric testing analysis provides
a valuable rst step before imposing more structure to the consumption model un-
der study. In this respect, our discussion for the necessary condition readily extends
towards the (complementary) nonparametric su¢ ciency conditions presented in Cher-
chye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007a,b); testing these su¢ ciency conditions (which
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have a formally similar structure) is computationally less demanding than testing the
necessary condition.
We concentrate on the formulation of the necessity test as a 0-1 Integer Pro-
gramming (IP) problem, which was proposed by Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2007b). While the theoretical discussion in Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2007b) concentrates on the usefulness of this IP formulation for addressing welfare-
related questions, we focus on the practical usefulness of the IP-based test for eval-
uating the goodness-of-tof the collective model subject to testing. In doing so,
we also argue that the IP formulation easily allows for incorporating a number of
mechanisms that enhance the computational e¢ ciency of the testing exercise.
Given this specic purpose, we apply the test to the RLMS data discussed above,
but now we maintain (or, alternatively, test) the assumption that the intra-household
allocation process and individual preferences are homogeneous for couples with males
born in the same year. This homogeneity assumption permits us to focus on sets of
observations that are bigger than those originally considered by Cherchye, De Rock
and Vermeulen (2005), and thus to assess the operational feasibility of the IP-based
necessity test for data sets of reasonable size. In addition, it demonstrates the use-
fulness of nonparametric tests for assessing homogeneity assumptions. As a matter
of fact, such a test can also be useful from a parametric point of view, given that
parametric studies often maintain similar homogeneity assumptions; as such, our em-
pirical application illustrates the value of (complementary) nonparametric collective
rationality tests prior to the actual parametric analysis.
At this point, it is worth indicating that our ndings for the collective rationality
tests can also be insightful in view of designing nonparametric tests that pertain to
the unitary model. For example, so far there does not exist a satisfactory (necessary
and su¢ cient) operational test for Varians (1983) nonparametric weak separability
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condition. In point of fact, existing unitary separability concepts are formally close
to the collective rationality concept under study; see, for example, Blundell and
Robin (2000) for a discussion. As such, similar IP-based tests could be conceived
for assessing separability in a unitary setting. Our study provides insight into the
practical operationalization of such tests.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the nonpara-
metric (revealed preference) conditions for collectively rational consumption behavior.
Section 3 focuses on operational IP-based procedures to test these nonparametric con-
ditions; this also includes the use of e¢ ciency-enhancing testing mechanisms. Section
4 discusses our application to the RLMS data. Section 5 considers extensions that
allow to evaluate the goodness-of-t while taking account of optimization error as
well as measurement error. Section 6 concludes.
As a nal note, we refer to the working paper version (Cherchye et al., 2008) for
a detailed description of the presented IP procedure; while the current study focuses
on two-person households, the working paper also considers the general setting with
M ( 2) household members. Sabbe (2007) provides details on the Matlab code that
is used in our empirical application.1
2 Collectively rational consumption behavior
2.1 The unitary model
To set the stage, we rst consider the unitary model for rational household consump-
tion behavior, which models the household as if it were a single decision maker. This
implies that each observed household quantity bundle is assumed to maximize a sin-
1Both papers, as well as the Matlab code, can be downloaded from http://www.kuleuven-
kortrijk.be/~u0052996/.
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gle utility function subject to the corresponding household budget constraint. The
unitary nonparametric condition for rational household consumption behavior then
essentially requires that there exists a well-behaved (i.e., non-satiated, concave and
continuous) utility function that rationalizes the observed household consumption in
terms of this unitary model.
We assume a situation with N goods and suppose that we observe T household
consumption quantity bundles qt 2 RN+ with prices pt 2 RN++ (t = 1; :::; T ). Let
S = f(pt;qt); t = 1; :::; Tg be the corresponding set of observations. A core result in
the nonparametric literature is that a unitary rationalization of the set of observations
S is possible if and only if it satises the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference
(Varian, 1982).
Denition 1 Let S = f(pt;qt) ; t = 1; :::; Tg be a set of observations. The set S
satises the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if there exist relations
R0; R that meet:
(i) if p0sqs  p0sqt then qs R0 qt;
(ii) if qs R0 qu; qu R0 qv; :::; qz R0 qt for some (possibly empty) sequence (u; v; :::;
z) then qs R qt;
(iii) if qs R qt then p0tqt  p0tqs:
In words, the quantities qs are directly revealed preferredover the quantities
qt (qs R0 qt) if qs were chosen when qt were equally attainable (p0sqs  p0sqt); see
(i). Next, the revealed preference relation R exploits transitivity of preferences;
see (ii). Finally, (iii) imposes that the quantities qt cannot be more expensive than
revealed preferred quantities qs; otherwise, the household would not act rationally in
the unitary sense.
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2.2 The general collective consumption model
In contrast to the standard unitary model, the collective model explicitly recognizes
the multi-person nature of multi-person households. Moreover, the general collective
consumption model under study allows for positive externalities and public consump-
tion in the intra-household allocation process. In the present context, public con-
sumption of a certain good, which must be distinguished from private consumption,
means that consumption of this good by one household member does not a¤ect the
supply available for another household member, and no individual can be excluded
from consuming it. Of course, some commodities may be partly publicly and partly
privately consumed (e.g., car use for a family trip versus car use for work). Next, con-
sumption externalities refer to the fact that one household member gets utility from
another members consumption (e.g., the wife enjoys her husbands nice clothes).
As stated in the introduction, we focus on the case with two household mem-
bers. Like before, we consider a set of observations S = f(pt;qt); t = 1; :::; Tg.
To model externalities and public consumption, we consider personalized quantities
bqt = (q1t ; q2t ; qht ). These personalized quantities decompose each (observed) aggregate
quantity bundle qt into quantities q1t and q
2
t 2 RN+ capturing the private consumption
of each household member and quantities qht 2 RN+ representing public consumption.
Of course, the di¤erent components of bqt must add up to the aggregate quantity
bundle for each observation t:
qt = q
1
t + q
2
t + q
h
t :
Each member m has a well-behaved utility function Um that is non-decreasing in
these personalized quantities, which e¤ectively accounts for (positive) externalities
and public consumption. The collective model then regards the observed household
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consumption as the Pareto e¢ cient outcome of a bargaining process between the two
household members. A combination of utility functions U1 and U2 provides a collec-
tive rationalization of S if for each observed quantity bundle qt, with corresponding
prices pt, there exist feasible personalized quantities bqt and a weight t 2 R++ such
that:
U1 (bqt) + tU2 (bqt)  U1  z1; z2; zh+ tU2  z1; z2; zh
for all z1; z2; zh 2 Rn+ with p0t[z1 + z2 + zh]  p0tqt:
In this formulation, the weight t can be interpreted as the relative bargaining weight
for the second household member; it represents the weight that is given to this mem-
bers utility function in the intra-household optimization process.
Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007a) established testable (necessary and suf-
cient) nonparametric conditions for such a collective rationalization of the data. In
doing so, they adopted the minimalistic prior that the empirical analyst only observes
the aggregate bundle qt and not its intra-household allocation; such unobservability
is often the case in practical applications. As argued in the introduction, our focus is
on the testable necessary condition; we will show that this condition has a direct in-
terpretation in terms of the Pareto e¢ ciency assumption that underlies the collective
consumption model.
2.3 Pareto e¢ ciency and hypothetical preference relations
The starting point of the nonparametric necessary condition is that the true member-
specic (revealed) preference relations are not observed, because only the aggregate
household quantities (qt) are observed and not the true personalized quantities
(q1t ; q
2
t and q
h
t ). Given this, the condition focuses on so-called hypothetical member-
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specic preference relations. These relations essentially represent feasible specica-
tions of the true individual preference relations in terms of a number of collective ra-
tionality conditions (i.e., conditions (i) to (v) in Proposition 1 below) dened on the
observed (aggregate household) quantities and prices. The nonparametric necessary
condition for collectively rational consumption behavior then requires that there must
exist at least one specication of the hypothetical member-specic preference relations
that simultaneously meets all these collective rationality conditions. The necessary
condition is summarized in the following proposition (Proposition 2 of Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen, 2007a):
Proposition 1 Suppose that there exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that
provide a collective rationalization of the set of observations S = f(pt;qt) ; t = 1; :::; Tg.
Then there exist hypothetical relations Hm0 ; H
m for each member m 2 f1; 2g such
that:
(i) if p0sqs  p0sqt, then qsH10qt or qsH20qt;
(ii) if qsHm0 qk,qkH
m
0 ql, ..., qzH
m
0 qt for some (possibly empty) sequence (k,l,...,z),
then qsHmqt;
(iii) if p0sqs  p0sqt and qtHmqs, then qsH l0qt (with l 6= m);
(iv) if p0sqs  p0s (qt1 + qt2) and qt1Hmqs, then qsH l0qt2 (with l 6= m);
(v)
8><>: a) if qsH
1qt and qsH2qt, then p0tqt  p0tqs
b) if qs1H
1qt and qs2H
2qt, then p0tqt  p0t(qs1 + qs2)
:
This condition has a formally similar structure as the unitary GARP condition
in Denition 1. The essential di¤erence is that Proposition 1 imposes restrictions
in terms of hypotheticalmember-specic preference relations Hm0 and H
m, while
GARP species restrictions in terms observable revealed preference relations R0
and R.
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Condition (i) applies to all situations with p0sqs  p0sqt. This means that the
bundle qt was equally obtainable under the prices ps and the outlay p0sqs that corre-
spond to the chosen bundle qs. In that case, Pareto e¢ ciency requires that at least
one household member must prefer the bundle qs to the bundle qt. If we assume that
member m prefers qs to qt, then we specify qsHm0 qt. Summarizing, the inequality
p0sqs  p0sqt requires that we specify qsHm0 qt for at least one m. Condition (ii) uses
that individual preferences are transitive.
The following conditions (iii) to (v) pertain to rationality across the household
members. Condition (iii) expresses that, if member 1 prefers some qt over qs, and the
bundle qt is not more expensive than qs, then the choice of qs can be rationalized
only if member 2 prefers qs over qt. Indeed, if this last condition were not satised,
then the bundle qt (under the given prices ps and outlay p0sqs) would imply an
improvement over the chosen bundle qs.
Similarly, condition (iv) states that, if qs is more expensive than the (newly de-
ned) bundle (qt1+qt2), while member 1 prefers qt1 over qs, then the only possibility
for rationalizing the choice of qs is that member 2 prefers qs over the remaining bun-
dle qt2. The interpretation in terms of Pareto e¢ ciency is directly similar to the one
for condition (iii).
Finally, condition (v) complements conditions (iii) and (iv); it denes upper cost
bounds for each observation t that depend on the specication of the relations Hm.
Part a) of condition (v) states that if both members prefer qs over qt, then the choice
of qt can be rationalized only if it is not more expensive than qs. Indeed, if this last
condition were not met, then for the given prices pt and outlay p0tqt all members
would be better o¤ by buying the bundle qs rather than the chosen bundle qt, which
of course conicts with Pareto e¢ ciency. Part b) of condition (v) expresses a similar
condition for the case where both members prefer a di¤erent bundle qsm to qt. In
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that case, the choice of qt can be rationalized only if it is not more expensive than
the bundle (qs1 + qs2).
To summarize, conditions (i) to (v) imply a necessary condition for collectively
rational household behavior that can be tested on the available aggregate (price and
quantity) information. Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007a) show that the
condition is rejectable in a two-person setting as soon as there are 3 goods and 3
observations.
3 Nonparametric tests of collective rationality
In this section, we show that the above nonparametric condition for collectively ra-
tional consumption behavior can be veried by solving an integer programming (IP)
problem. This IP formulation was introduced in Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2007b); we focus on its practical operationalization. Firstly, we present the basic
testing procedure. Secondly, we posit that the IP formulation is particularly conve-
nient from a practical point of view, because it allows implementing the e¢ ciency
enhancing mechanisms that were presented by Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2005). This obtains an e¢ ciency-enhanced testing procedure.
3.1 Basic testing procedure
In its basic form, the testing procedure involves constructing an IP problem and
checking whether the feasible region for this problem is empty. The binary decision
variables xmst 2 f0; 1g of this problem correspond to the previously dened hypothet-
ical relations Hm. For m = 1; 2 and s; t 2 f1; :::; Tg, we dene
xmst = 1 if qsH
mqt and xmst = 0 otherwise.
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Furthermore, we introduce some additional notation that will be used to translate
the conditions in Proposition 1 to their IP counterparts:
d1[s; t] = 1 if p0sqs  p0sqt and 0 otherwise;
d+1 [s; t] = 1 if p
0
sqs > p
0
sqt and 0 otherwise;
d2[s; t1; t2] = 1 if p0sqs  p0s (qt1 + qt2) and 0 otherwise;
d+2 [s; t1; t2] = 1 if p
0
sqs > p
0
s (qt1 + qt2) and 0 otherwise.
The IP formulation will solely focus on combinations of observations for which d(+)1 [s; t]
= 1 or d(+)2 [s; t1; t2] = 1. Indeed, it follows from our discussion of conditions (i) to
(v) in Proposition 1 that only such combinations dene relevant empirical restrictions
for the collective rationality test; i.e., only such combinations can yield an empirical
rejection of collectively rational consumption behavior.
Given this, it is easy to verify that conditions (i) to (v) in Proposition 1 can be
reformulated in IP terms as conditions (IP-i) to (IP-v) below. These conditions are
dened in terms of the binary variables xmst .
Proposition 2 Suppose that there exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that
provide a collective rationalization of the set of observations S = f(pt;qt) ; t = 1; :::; Tg.
Then there exists at least one combination of binary variables xmst 2 f0; 1g such that
for each member m; l 2 f1; 2g, we have:
(IP-i) 8s; t : x1st + x2st  d1[s; t];
(IP-ii) 8s; t; u : xmsu + xmut  1 + xmst ;
(IP-iii) 8s; t : d1[s; t] + xmts  1 + xlst (with l 6= m);
(IP-iv) 8s; t1; t2 (t1 6= t2) : d2[s; t1; t2] + xmt1s  1 + xlst2 (with l 6= m);
12
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(IP-v)
8><>: a) 8s; t : x
1
st + x
2
st  2  d+1 [t; s]
b) 8s1; s2; t : x1s1t + x2s2t  2  d+2 [t; s1; s2]
:
Thus, we can nonparametrically verify data consistency with collective rationality
by checking non-emptiness of the feasible set of an IP problem: for a given set of
observations S, there exists a specication of the hypothetical relations Hm0 and H
m
that simultaneously satises conditions (i) to (v) in Proposition 1 if and only if there
exists a specication of the variables xmst that simultaneously meets conditions (IP-i)
to (IP-v) in Proposition 2. Strictly speaking, this implies a 0-1 IP feasibility problem;
the objective is to nd at least one feasible solution satisfying conditions (IP-i) to
(IP-v).
3.2 E¢ ciency-enhanced testing procedure
Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2005) presented two e¢ ciency-enhancing mech-
anisms that are tailored to the problem at hand: ltering and subsetting. These
mechanisms are easily integrated in the testing procedure. Essentially, these mecha-
nisms reduce the number of observations that are to be considered in the collective
rationality test, by exploiting the results of a (computationally easy) unitary GARP
test preceding the collective rationality test. Because the complexity of the test-
ing problem rises exponentially with the amount of observations, the use of these
e¢ ciency-enhancing mechanisms can generate considerable e¢ ciency gains in prac-
tice. This will also appear from our own empirical application in Section 4.
The basic idea underlying the ltering mechanism is that tests for collective ra-
tionality need only consider observations that are implicated in a sequence of obser-
vations entailing a violation of the unitary GARP condition. A fortiori, only such
observations can be involved in a violation of the collective rationality condition. The
13
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other observations are irrelevant in that they can be omitted without changing the
test result.
A closely related e¢ ciency-enhancing mechanism is subsetting. In essence, this
amounts to constructing mutually independent subsets of observations for which the
collective rationality test can be carried out separately. In this context, mutual inde-
pendence means that any two subsets have no observations in common. Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen (2005) argue that testing the collective rationality condition for
each subset separately is equivalent to testing the condition at the level of their union.
Again, this is easily implemented by checking feasibility of a separate IP-problem for
each subset. If at least one IP-problem turns out to be infeasible, then collective
rationality is rejected.
4 Application
Parametric applications of demand theory typically start from a demand system
specication where, in addition to prices and total expenditures, one also controls
for demographic variables that inuence preferences such as age, schooling level and
regional dummies (see, for example, Browning and Meghir, 1991, Banks, Blundell
and Lewbel, 1997, and Browning and Chiappori, 1998). The nonparametric counter-
part to this approach would be to apply revealed preference conditions to relatively
homogeneous subsamples of households (see, for example, Blundell, Browning and
Crawford, 2003, and Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2006). With panel data at hand, it is
even possible to treat each household as a time series in its own right. This allows
for maximal heterogeneity across households and, for a particular household, only re-
quires an assumption about homogeneity of the intra-household allocation process and
individual preferences over time. Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2005) followed
14
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this approach when they conducted nonparametric tests for collective rationality on
the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), which is a panel with detailed
household consumption. Although this obtained no more than 8 observations per cou-
ple, the substantial relative price variation across time enabled them to test unitary
and collective rationality in a meaningful way.
As stated in the introduction, a main purpose of the current study is to explore
the operational aspects of the IP-based testing procedure presented above. More
specically, we want to demonstrate the practical usefulness of our IP-based test
procedure. As far as we know, existing panel data with detailed consumption only
contain a rather limited number of observations per household. For example, Chris-
tensen (2007) and Blow, Browning and Crawford (2008) use, respectively, Spanish
and Danish consumer panels with at most 24 observations per household. Because
we want to demonstrate that the proposed IP-based procedure can handle data sets
that are at least of the same order of magnitude, we will again make use of the RLMS,
but now we maintain (or, alternatively, test) homogeneity of the intra-household al-
location process and individual preferences for couples where males share the same
birth year. As discussed in the introduction, this also illustrates the usefulness of
nonparametric tests for assessing homogeneity assumptions that are frequently used
in practice. This can be instrumental for parametric analyses as well. The rest of
this section provides a more detailed discussion of the data used in our tests and,
subsequently, presents the main results of our empirical analysis.
4.1 Data
Our data are drawn from Phase II of the RLMS, which covers the time period between
1994 and 2003 (Rounds V-XII). The data set contains detailed expenditures and
15
AC
C
EP
TE
D
M
AN
U
SC
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
other characteristics from a nationally representative sample of Russian households.
Although the RLMS survey design focuses on a longitudinal study of populations of
dwelling units, it allows a panel analysis of those households remaining in the original
dwelling unit over time.
In the empirical application, we focus on couples with nobody else in the house-
hold. Both members are employed in each household that we selected; this mitigates
the issue of non-separability between consumption and leisure (see Browning and
Meghir, 1991). Next, in order to fully exploit the relative price variation, we only
consider households that were observed in all the available rounds of Phase II of the
RLMS. This results in a basic sample of 148 couples that are observed 8 times. For
each couple, we will focus on a rather detailed consumption bundle that consists of
21 nondurable goods: (1) bread, (2) potatoes, (3) vegetables, (4) fruit, (5) meat,
(6) dairy products, (7) fat, (8) sugar, (9) eggs, (10) sh, (11) other food items, (12)
alcohol, (13) tobacco, (14) food outside the home, (15) clothing, (16) car fuel, (17)
wood fuel, (18) gas fuel, (19) luxury goods, (20) services and (21) rent. Prices are
obtained by averaging recorded prices across the households in a given census region.
Some of the commodities that we use are aggregate commodities. The price index for
a composite commodity is the weighted geometric mean of the prices of the di¤erent
items in the aggregate good, with weights equal to the average budget shares in a
given census region (i.e., the Stone price index). For more details on this RLMS
data set, including summary statistics, we refer to Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2005).
On the basis of the aggregate sample of 148 couples, we construct samples of
households that contain potentially more than 8 observations. More specically, we
merge all couples of which males share the same birth year. Since we observe 42
di¤erent birth years, this implies 42 data sets to which the testing algorithms can be
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applied separately. As can be seen from Table 1, data set sizes vary from 8 to 128
observations, with on average 28.19 observations per data set; this implies relatively
big data sets as compared to the existing consumer panels mentioned above.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
We note that, in principle, the IP procedure can handle any number of observa-
tions. But, in practice, for a given computer conguration there will be physical limits
(dened in terms of computer memory and speed). As for a data set that exceeds
these physical limits, a possible solution consists of repeatedly applying the test to
randomly drawn subsamples of the original set of observations. If the subsamples are
su¢ ciently small, then such a procedure is always feasible. In addition, it naturally
complies with the necessary nature of the collective rationality condition that is sub-
ject to testing. This subsampling procedure will be illustrated in our own empirical
application.
4.2 Results
We programmed the construction of our IP problem in Matlab (version 7.4.0.287),
because of the matrix-oriented structure of our problem and Matlabs wide avail-
ability. Once the IP problem is constructed, any optimization package can be used
to solve the problem. We used CPLEX (version 10.2) and the free Matlab interface
CPLEXINT to solve the problems on a standard desktop conguration with 1.86 GHz
processor and 1 Gb RAM memory.2
As a benchmark case, it is interesting to rst consider the results for the unitary
GARP test. We nd that only 19 of our 45 data sets (i.e., 45.24%) satisfy GARP,
2See also the Matlab and CPLEX references in our bibliography for more details. As for the
IP solver that is used, an obvious choice would have been the Matlab built-in IP solver Bintprog.
However, Bintprog performed much worse than CPLEX on our bigger data sets.
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which means that they are consistent with the unitary model and, therefore, cannot
yield a violation of our collective rationality condition. More than half of the data sets
reject the unitary rationality condition; for these data sets our collective rationality
condition can be meaningfully tested.
Before turning to these collective rationality tests, it is interesting to assess the
e¤ects of the two e¢ ciency enhancing mechanisms that we discussed in Section 3
(which, to recall, exploit the results of the unitary GARP test). Table 2 provides a
summary of the results; more detailed results are given in the Appendix. First, it
is clear from Table 2 that the ltering mechanism is extremely useful: the average
number of relevant observations (12.79) is far below the average number of observa-
tions in the original data sets (28.19); on average, more than 15 observations can be
omitted from a data set without changing the result of the collective rationality test.
The maximum number of relevant observations is 110 and the minimum number is 0;
this minimum refers to data sets that can be rationalized by a unitary model.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Next, the subsetting mechanism also proves to be helpful: Table 2 shows that on
average 1.64 subsets can be constructed per data set. While the minimum number
of subsets is 0 (i.e., the data sets that are consistent with the unitary model), the
maximum number is no less than 6. If we have a closer look at these subsets, then we
nd that the largest subset (which generally requires most of the computation time)
contains on average 8.71 observations, which is quite below the average of 28.19 initial
observations per data set. Note, however, that our results show substantial variation:
the number of observations in the largest subset ranges from 0 to 101. Given that
the necessity test can be computationally burdensome when applied to large data
sets, these are interesting results from a practical point of view: they show that the
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e¢ ciency-enhancing mechanisms e¤ectively generate considerable e¢ ciency gains in
practice, which of course contributes to the operational feasibility of our IP-based
test.
We next turn to the results of the IP-based collective rationality tests. The IP
procedure reached a conclusion for all data sets except the largest one with 128
observations, which appeared to be too big for CPLEX to handle due to memory
limitations. For each of the other data sets, CPLEX found a solution for the IP
problem in less than ve minutes of computation time. Once more, there is substantial
variation across the data sets: the minimum is less than a second, while the maximum
equals almost 5 minutes. All in all, these results are very reasonable, in particular
because our IP-based tests were performed on a standard desktop conguration.
For all data sets for which the IP procedure reached a conclusion, the data e¤ec-
tively passed the (necessary) collective rationality condition subject to testing. As
for the one data set with 128 observations, we conducted the subsampling procedure
suggested above: we repeatedly applied the IP test to randomly drawn subsamples of
sizes 50, 60 and 70 (100 replications for each size; subsamples drawn from the largest
subset with 101 observations). Each of these subsamples was consistent with the
collective rationality condition; and we thus conclude that we cannot reject collective
rationality for this remaining data set.
One possible conclusion of these results is that they e¤ectively conrm the as-
sumption of homogeneity of the intra-household allocation process and individual
preferences for couples with males born in the same year, which -to recall- is jointly
tested with collective rationality in our application. Given our specic selection of
couples (with both household members employed, and nobody else in the household),
this could indeed be a valid interpretation. An alternative (and complementary) con-
clusion pertains to the generality of the model that is subject to testing, which implies
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minimal a priori structure on the intra-household allocation process. Such a general
model may induce low power (i.e., a low probability of detecting collectively irrational
behavior). From this perspective, the IP-based test under study can be considered
as a useful rst step of a more focused analysis; in such a set-up, subsequent steps
can impose additional structure on the collective decision model. We return to these
power-related issues in the concluding section.
5 Goodness-of-t
The collective rationality tests reviewed above are sharp tests; they only tell us
whether observations are exactly optimizing in terms of the behavioral model that is
under evaluation. However, as argued by Varian (1990), exact optimization may not
be a very interesting hypothesis. Rather, one may be interested whether the behav-
ioral model under study provides a reasonable way to describe observed behavior; for
most purposes, nearly optimizing behavioris just as good as optimizingbehavior.
This pleads for using measures that quantify the goodness-of-t of the behavioral
model under study. In our illustrative application, all data pass the collective ratio-
nality tests. This makes the goodness-of-t concern redundant in this case, since the
data perfectly t the (necessary) empirical implications of the collective model under
study.
Still, it is worth indicating that our IP-based testing methodology easily allows
for taking such goodness-of-t concerns into account for data sets that do reject the
collective rationality condition. Specically, we consider two goodness-of-t measures
that have been suggested in the literature on nonparametric tests for the unitary
model; we translate these measures towards our collective set-up. The rst measure
is inspired by Varians (1990) idea to quantify goodness-of-t in terms of optimization
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error (which obtains an actual expenditure level that exceeds the -in casu collectively-
rational level); it can be interpreted as a measure for the economic signicance of
observed violations of collective rationality. The second measure is based on Var-
ians (1985) idea to quantify goodness-of-t in terms of measurement error, and can
be interpreted as a measure for the statistical signicance of observed violations of
collective rationality. To structure our following discussion, we will treat the two
measures separately. Still, in practice it can be useful to combine both measures.
For example, one may quantify the statistical signicance of violations of collective
rationality that account for a certain degree of optimization error. Starting from the
methodology introduced below, such extensions should be fairly straightforward.
To calculate the goodness-of-t measures, we endogenously dene the variablesed(+)1 [s; t] and ed(+)2 [s; t1; t2] 2 f0; 1g in the programming problem; i.e., we treat them
as binary decision variables in our problem formulation. Specically, for all s; t; t1;
t2 we include the additional restrictions
ed1[s; t]  p0s (eqs   eqt) + "; (1)ed+1 [s; t]  p0s (eqs   eqt) ;ed2[s; t1; t2]  p0s (eqs   (eqt1 + eqt2)) + ";ed+2 [s; t1; t2]  p0s (eqs   (eqt1 + eqt2)) .
For any " arbitrarily close to zero and positive, this implies ed1[s; t] = 1 if p0seqs  p0seqt
and d+1 [s; t] = 1 if p
0
seqs > p0seqt (and analogously for ed(+)2 [s; t1; t2]). In this for-
mulation, the vectors eqt 2 RN+ are endogenously dened quantities; they are also
treated as decision variables in the programming formulation. Essentially, the fol-
lowing goodness-of-t measures seek minimal adjustments in the original quantity
values, which implies eqt that are as close as possibleto the observed quantities qt;
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the criterion for closenessdepends on the specic goodness-of-t measure at hand.
5.1 Optimization error and economic signicance
The rst measure quanties optimization error ; it is inspired on the goodness-of-t
idea of Varian (1990), which is based on Afriat (1972, 1973). This measure quanties
the economic signicance of observed violations of collective rationality. It seeks the
minimal proportional reductions of the observed expenditure levels that is required
for establishing consistency with the collective rationality condition. For compact-
ness, our following discussion mainly focuses on the calculation of such goodness-of-t
measures by starting from the IP formulation discussed in the previous section. We
refer to Varian (1990) for a detailed discussion on the interpretation of these mea-
sures in practical applications. While Varian focused on the unitary model, his main
arguments directly carry over to the general collective model under consideration.
In our formulation, we calculate the reductions in the expenditure levels in terms
of proportional reductions of the observed quantities qt. Specically, we dene for
each observation t
eqt = tqt with 0  t  1. (2)
Again, we treat each variable t as an endogenously dened decision variable. The
interpretation is easy: for every observation t, the corresponding value of t captures
a proportional expenditure reduction that is independent of the price vector that is
used (i.e., t = (p0eqt=p0qt) for every p 2 RN++).
Finally, given that we are interested in minimal adjustments of the observed quan-
tity vectors, we can dene the objective function of the newly dened programming
problem as follows:
max
XT
t=1
t
T
:
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In combination with the decision variables ed(+)1 [s; t] and ed(+)2 [s; t1; t2] and eqt dened
in (1) and (2), and after adding the conditions (IP-i) to (IP-v) in Proposition 2, this
obtains a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem. This MILP structure
implies that the measure can be operationalized, and so provides a useful tool for
practical applications.
The optimal objective function value has a direct interpretation in terms of re-
quired expenditure reduction for establishing collective rationality. First, an optimal
objective value of unity indicates consistency of observed behavior with the collective
rationality condition. In this case, no adjustment of the observed quantities is neces-
sary (eqt = qt and t = 1 for all t). In the other case, the optimum objective value
(below unity) indicates the average expenditure reduction that is required to obtain
consistency with the collective rationality conditions. Each t gives the correspond-
ing expenditure reduction for every individual observation t. Generally, the objective
value can be compared to a specied cut-o¤ level, to assess whether or not observed
violations are economically signicant; a cut-o¤ level 1   (e.g., 0:95 or 0:90) then
corresponds to a signicance level  (e.g., 0:05 or 0:10).
5.2 Measurement error and statistical signicance
The second measure quanties measurement error. It extends the idea of Varian
(1985) to the collective rationality test. This obtains a test for the statistical sig-
nicance of observed violations of collective rationality. Like before, we will mainly
concentrate on the calculation of this goodness-of-t measure. (We refer to Varian
(1985) for a more detailed discussion on its interpretation.)
In this case, the vectors qt =
 
q1;t; :::; qN ;t
0
stand for the truequantities, which
can be di¤erent from the observed quantities qt = (q1;t; :::; qN ;t)
0. To account for
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measurement error, we assume the following relationship between true and observed
quantities:
qn;t = qn;t + n;t for n = 1; :::; N and t = 1; :::; T;
with the error term n;t assumed to be an independently and identically distributed
random variable drawn fromN (0; 2), with 2 the variance of the measurement error.
Using this, a statistical test for data consistency with the collective rationality model
can compute the test statistic
NX
n=1
TX
t=1
 
qn;t   qn;t
2
2
: (3)
Under the null hypothesis that the true data satisfy the collective rationality condi-
tion, the test statistic follows a Chi-squared distribution with NT degrees of freedom.
As such, collective rationality for the data would be rejected if this test statistic ex-
ceeded the critical value that corresponds to a specied signicance level. However,
this test statistic is not observable. Therefore, following Varian (1985), a lower bound
on the above statistic can be calculated by means of the programme
min
NX
n=1
TX
t=1
(eqn;t   qn;t)2
2
subject to the vectors eqt = (eq1;t; :::; eqN ;t)0 satisfying the necessary condition for collec-
tive rationality. Specically, using the decision variables ed(+)1 [s; t] and ed(+)2 [s; t1; t2] in
(1), and adding the conditions (IP-i) to (IP-v) in Proposition 2 obtains a mixed inte-
ger quadratic programming (MIQP) problem, which again implies operationalization
and thus practical usefulness.
Under the null hypothesis, the truedata satisfy the constraint, which implies
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that the resulting function value of the above minimization programme should be no
larger than the test statistic (3). Consequently, if we reject the null hypothesis on
the basis of the obtained function value, then we certainly reject the null hypothesis
on the basis of the true test statistic.
In practice, an important di¢ culty concerns the specication of the variance 2.
Varian (1985) discusses two alternative solutions. First, we can use estimates of the
error variance derived from (parametric or nonparametric) ts of the data, or from
knowledge about how accurately the variables were measured. Alternatively, we can
calculate how big the variance needs to be in order the reject to null hypothesis of
collectively rational behavior and compare this to our prior opinions regarding the
precision with which the data have been measured.
6 Concluding discussion
We have presented an IP-based nonparametric (revealed preference) testing proce-
dure for collectively rational consumption behavior. We focused on the necessary
condition derived by Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007a) for a general col-
lective consumption model, which accounts for consumption externalities and public
consumption while using minimal assumptions on observable price-quantity informa-
tion. We also showed that the procedure readily allows for incorporating a number
of e¢ ciency-enhancing testing mechanisms. Finally, we presented extensions of the
testing procedure to evaluate the goodness-of-t of the general collective consumption
model; when data do not pass the sharpcondition for collective rationality, such a
goodness-of-t analysis is easily incorporated in the IP formulation. As discussed
in the introduction, our ndings for IP-based tests of the collective model can also
be useful to conceive IP-based procedures for testing within a unitary setting (e.g.,
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testing specic separability assumptions).
An empirical application to households drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Mon-
itoring Survey (RLMS) demonstrated the practical usefulness of the IP-based testing
procedure. Specically, using a maintained assumption that the intra-household al-
location process and individual preferences are homogeneous for couples with males
born in the same year, we constructed 42 data sets containing between 8 and 128
observations; we conducted the IP-based test for each data set separately. Firstly, we
found that the e¢ ciency-enhancing mechanisms e¤ectively can (often substantially)
reduce the computational burden of the test in practical applications. Next, using
a standard desktop conguration, our IP-based collective rationality tests came to a
conclusion in less than ve minutes for all but one of our 42 data sets. For the one
remaining data set the IP problem exceeded the computational limits of our desktop
conguration; in this case, we performed a subsampling procedure that repeatedly
applies the test to randomly drawn subsamples of the original set of observations.
This procedure is always feasible when the subsamples are su¢ ciently small; and
it complies with the necessary nature of the collective rationality condition that is
subject to testing.
We could not reject collective rationality for any of the 42 data sets. One possible
conclusion is that the jointly tested collective rationality and homogeneity assump-
tions e¤ectively do hold for the data sets under study; given our specic selection
criteria, which obtain relatively homogeneous data sets, this may indeed be a valid
interpretation. Alternatively, the fact that all data pass the collective rationality tests
may signal low power (i.e., low probability of detecting collectively irrational behav-
ior). Indeed, the general collective model imposes minimal prior structure, which can
make it hardly rejectable in practice. Although the nonparametric collective ratio-
nality condition under study can clearly be rejected on the basis of aggregate price
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and quantity data, the question remains how powerful the theoretical implications
are in real-life applications. Such power considerations are especially relevant when
the main focus is on testing specic behavioral hypotheses as such, rather than on
operational aspects, as in this study.
As for practical applications in which a power analysis is recommendable, it is
worth noting that the presented IP-based collective rationality tests readily include
power measures that have been suggested in a unitary framework (e.g., Bronars,
1987, and Andreoni and Harbaugh, 2006); see, e.g., Cherchye, De Rock and Ver-
meulen (2005) and Cherchye and Vermeulen (2006) for such power assessments of
(less general) collective models. Next, if the power turns out to be low, additional
prior structure can be imposed in practical applications (e.g., in terms of public con-
sumption and externalities within the household). As we have discussed, such extra
structure is easily implemented by starting from the IP formulation presented in this
paper; see the corresponding theoretical specications in Cherchye, De Rock and Ver-
meulen (2007b). Finally, the power of the nonparametric collective rationality tests
could be further increased by suitably adapting the sequential maximum power path
idea of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2005), who originally focused on a
unitary setting.
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Appendix: Details on tested data sets
Birth year Nr. of obs. N r. of relevant obs. N r. of subsets N r. of obs. p er subset
1918 8 3 1 3
1919 8 0 0 0
1920 8 0 0 0
1922 8 0 0 0
1923 16 0 0 0
1924 40 26 4 2;2 ;7 ;15
1925 8 0 0 0
1926 48 18 4 2;2 ;3 ;11
1927 56 50 5 3;4 ;4 ;12;27
1928 24 9 2 2;7
1929 64 43 4 3;3 ;5 ;32
1930 64 43 5 2;2 ;6 ;16;17
1931 40 4 2 2;2
1932 40 13 3 2;5 ;6
1933 16 4 1 4
1934 16 0 0 0
1935 128 110 3 2;7 ;101
1936 80 53 6 2;2 ;2 ;2 ;5 ;40
1937 56 32 4 2;4 ;5 ;21
1938 64 41 6 2;4 ;4 ;6 ;9 ;16
1939 48 2 1 2
1940 56 25 4 2;2 ;3 ;18
1941 48 31 3 2;3 ;26
1942 16 0 0 0
1943 8 0 0 0
1944 8 0 0 0
1945 24 4 2 2;2
1946 16 0 0 0
1947 16 0 0 0
1948 24 10 3 2;4 ;4
1949 16 2 1 2
1950 24 5 1 5
1951 8 0 0 0
1953 8 0 0 0
1954 16 4 2 2;2
1955 8 0 0 0
1957 8 0 0 0
1960 8 0 0 0
1962 8 5 2 2;3
1964 8 0 0 0
1969 8 0 0 0
1972 8 0 0 0
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Table 1: Frequency table for data set sizes
Number of observations Frequency
8 16
16 8
24 4
40 3
48 3
56 3
64 3
80 1
128 1
Total 42
32
AC
C
EP
TE
D
M
AN
U
SC
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Table 2: Descriptive statistics after use of e¢ ciency-enhancing mechanisms
Average Std. dev. Min. Max.
Number of observations per data set 28.19 26.22 8 128
Number of relevant observations per data set 12.79 22.09 0 110
Number of subsets per data set 1.64 1.91 0 6
Number of observations in largest subset 8.71 17.72 0 101
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